Bootcamps for Serious Offenders Don’t Work!

The experience from managing New Zealand’s Military Activity Camp, the MAC

 

What was the MAC

As part of the FreshStart package for young offenders introduced by the New Zealand Government in 2011, officials were charged with establishing a military-style activity camp, generally known as a ‘boot camp’. The camp, which became termed the MAC, provided places for up to 40 boys (4 intakes of up to 10 boys per year) aged 16 or 17 years, who were serious offenders on the cusp of being transferred to the Adult Court. The programme ran from the last quarter of 2011 to the third quarter of 2015. More than 100 young people participated. The programme closed in 2015 because there were inadequate numbers of young people to justify its continuation. During this period there were diminishing volumes of young people offending and subsequently appearing in court, coupled with a strong drive within the Youth Justice sector to use more community-based intensive supervision orders such as the Supervision with Activity (SWA).

 

Attendees undertook a 9-week residential training package followed by up to 12 months of intensive supervisory support in the community. The daily programme involved an early rise for the young people who undertook physical education and military training exercises before and after breakfast. At 9 a.m. all participants attended school for the morning. A lunch break was followed by further physical activity to complete the hour.  Schooling resumed until 3 p.m. The rest of the afternoon was a mixture of further military activities such as marching, physical fitness, and team activities, interspersed with other educational, therapeutic, skills development and recreational programmes lasting through until dinner time. Various attempts at providing cognitive behavioural (CBT) interventions were included. After dinner, there was some allowance for non-structured activities or other programmes. During the weekends when there was no schooling, the military and recreational components of the MAC were substituted. In the middle of the nine week period, there was a five day off-site wilderness trek that comprised the ‘camp’ component.

 

Intervention Logic

A literature review showed no support for Bootcamps as an effective strategy for changing behaviour in high-risk offenders, hence there was no blueprint to work from. The only criterion for planners was that the New Zealand Defence Force had a significant presence.

 

The intervention logic for the MAC was built around the Risk, Needs and Responsivity Principles and known best practices for effective interventions for young people who offend. There was a heavy focus on education and skills building. Some of the literature that underpins these approaches is referenced at the end of this article.

 

Because the MAC was held in a custodial environment there were benefits and constraints on how well the ‘best practice’ elements could be applied. For example, best practice does not support ‘Boot Camp’ type approaches and emphasises the importance of community based interventions. On the other hand, education services were readily available and well attended in the MAC but continued access proved to be problematic once the participants returned to the community. As best they could, planners attempted to use the whole of the sentence available, that is the custodial and post release supervision phase, to provide all the elements necessary for an effective intervention.

 

The Role of The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)

NZDF provided activities, structure, and discipline. MAC incorporated the military ethos of equality, that is everyone is treated the same way when they wear the uniform. The boys were issued with the same tracksuits. Cultural activities were led by NZDF including haka and waitata. They also modelled inclusivity and respect for all cultures. All legal authorities, including physical intervening, remained with the custodian, Child, Youth and Family.

 

Things That Worked Well

Three things that worked well:

·         The educational approach produced good results with young people's academic achievement showing demonstrable improvements

·         The young people adopted the structured nature of the overall programme for the duration. This was most evident in the March Out (final graduation ceremony) which was always well supported by dignitaries and family/whanau

·         There were consistently fewer incidents in the MAC unit compared to those in the other units on campus

 

It is worth mentioning that an important feature of the residential model is the ability of staff, social workers, youth workers and teachers, to engage quickly with the young people in their care. Engagement is a critical first step in getting a young person to be responsive and participate in the journey of change. The NZDF did this well and most people directly involved with the MAC would agree, appeared to be good role models. They were young, tended to be Māori or Pacifica, although not exclusively, and of both genders. The ethnicity profiles tended to match those of the participants.

 

The addition of the NZDF to the residential environment contributed to making it highly structured. It was not surprising to planners that the young people responded well to this. For those involved in otherwise chaotic lifestyles, a degree of certainty and routine provided something that was missing from their day-to-day existence. 

 

What Didn’t Work

Both the cognitive programmes and effective transitioning back to the community proved highly problematic.

 

Cognitive Behavioural Treatment Programmes (CBT)

The provision of CBT was a failure. Common wisdom/practice for these interventions is that they generally require committed participants and eight or nine months to complete. The MAC programme was nine weeks. There was no specific CBT for adolescents available. The best short-term substitutes, including an adapted programme provided by the Department of Corrections, were not fit for purpose despite the best efforts of the providers.

 

Individualised treatment could have been substituted (and was tried for a few cases) however the issues with this were:

·         The Youth Justice residential system does not have the specialised highly trained staff required to support intensive treatment programmes

·         Clustering young people with problems 24/7 is counterproductive to good outcomes

·         The residences do not provide a supportive and conducive environment for treatment

·         Post-programme support and follow-up are problematic because of the unavailability of appropriate services in many of our communities

 

Effective Transitioning

Effective transitioning, especially from a national programme that serviced the whole country, was challenging.

·         There was a real emphasis on post-release planning but it still fell short of what was needed

·         During the March Outs, parents, caregivers and others regularly stated their commitment to ensuring that the progress the boys had made would be supported once they returned to the community however the benefits could not be sustained

·         In most cases, the young people returned to the same environments they came from that contributed to their behaviour in the first place

·         There was a deficit in preparing the caregivers for the return of their young person, including identifying and providing any support they might need

·         Also unable to be replicated in the community was the sense of achievement, camaraderie and belonging that comes from being part of a team

·         Moving from a highly controlled environment to a considerably less structured placement may have exacerbated the challenges of transition. It is difficult to confirm without a more comprehensive evaluation 

 

Results

In terms of the measured results from the MAC intervention:

·         There were 80 participants for which 12 months of post-release data were available This is a small sample from which to  gather anything but high-level trends

·         Post-release data showed reductions in overall offending by almost all participants compared to the 12 months prior to admission

·         The results from each MAC intake varied. On average, they showed:

o   75% reduction in severity and frequency of the offending

o   14% of the young people did not offend within the 12 months

o   30% ended up in custody again, either residence or prison

·         The results were very similar to those of young people in the residential system on a Supervision with Residence Order, SWR, (the only Youth Justice custodial order) 

·         Results for intensive Supervision Orders, (Supervision with Activity SWA) were better

o   18% did not re-offend within the 12 month post-release period

o   80% had reduced frequency and severity of offending

o   35% of young people failed in community supervision and were incarcerated, slightly higher than for MAC or SWR

·         Note there were larger numbers in the samples for the SWR and SWA Orders so the data has more validity

 

These results for the MAC and other residential and intensive supervision orders need to be regarded with caution because most of the young people were on post-release supervision during the 12 month follow-up period.

 

One systemic benefit that came out of the MAC was that reoffending rates were measured for the first time. While the Government of the time expected that the MAC approach would ‘turn these hardcore young offenders lives around’, it did not happen as they expected. This was not a surprise to practitioners who had no such expectations. The conversation thereafter moved from ‘cure’ to ‘risk reduction’ which was more realistic and in line with what other international jurisdictions measure.

 

Could a MAC be Adapted to Produce Better Results?

There is a question as to whether a MAC-type programme could be altered or adapted to be more effective. An argument might be made that longer periods in the programme would possibly engender better results. There are two reasons for this. The routines and structure could be better integrated into the young people's lives if they are obliged to do them for longer. Also, if the program is long enough it might allow for proper cognitive behavioural treatment. However, there are still significant issues that need to be overcome.

 

Cognitive Behavioural Treatment group programmes for adolescents are not readily available so would need to be developed. This would take considerable time. Participants need to be motivated to undertake CBT and it is unclear whether compulsion as part of a sentence would achieve the genuine commitment needed for the CBT to be effective. There also may be a need for relapse prevention follow-up and support options that need to be developed.

 

The challenge to properly reintegrate would still be there. Indeed it may be exacerbated because of the extended period of time the young people have been living in a tightly structured environment. Unless the appropriate services are developed, many communities will not have the structures in place necessary to sustain effective transitions. There is also a need to include support services for the caregivers, something not previously funded and missing from the post-release MAC planning.

 

A More Effective Approach is in Increasing the Availability and Quality of Community Programmes

In many instances transition plans from the MAC had to be cobbled together as best they could using what was accessible whether it was adequate to meet specific needs or not. There were almost always gaps in the plans due to the unavailability of services and programmes. This issue is not solely confined to the MAC, it is also a significant issue in all situations where a young person has had a sustained period in custody.

 

In the extensive literature on what works to change the behaviour of young people who are offending, community-based interventions are identified as most likely to produce sustainable results. This conclusion was evidenced by the comparisons of the effectiveness of the various orders cited earlier in the ‘Results’ section of this document. There are good reasons to look to this area of development as a real opportunity if the desire to make communities safer is genuine. While it is understandable that the distribution of our population makes it challenging to get these resources everywhere they need to be, there is substantial room for improved coverage.

 

Not only would such a community-focused investment be useful for managing serious offenders, but it would also be a valuable resource for managing young people who are on the cusp of a custodial sentence. As a potential diversionary option, it would reduce the likelihood of escalation into the justice system.

 

There is a cost and time investment required to increase the number of services and programmes. Much of this could be offset by repurposing existing targeted funds. For example, some of the residences, (which are of dubious benefit), could be closed and the operational funding redirected. There are currently proposals to build two new residences. Don’t do it, redirect the funds.

 

There will also be a cost to establishing the boot camp. This potential funding could be directed to bolstering community programmes, which it has already been noted, would be necessary to support transitions.

 

There are benefits in utilising a MAC style approach to help young people develop fitness, teamwork, self-esteem, a positive peer group, and role models to which they can aspire. However, this can be achieved without needing to have a fully custodial residential programme. There are existing military academies for at-risk young people that demonstrate effective results so the model should not be dismissed out of hand but it should be noted that these are targeted and effective for ‘at risk’ youth at the lower end of the risk spectrum so more in the diversionary space or as an approach to reduce escalation.

 

Chris Polaschek

 

*Some of the reference material that was used to underpin the MAC model

 

Andrews D, Bonta J  - The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 3e éd., Anderson Publishing Company Cincinnati: Ohio 2003

 

Barton W, Butts J, Building on Strength: Positive Youth Development in Juvenile Justice Programs University of Chicago Chaplin Hall 2008

 

Borum, R (2003).  Managing at-risk juvenile offenders in the community.  Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 19, 1, 115-137

 

Carrol A, Houghton S, Durkin K.  Early-Onset Life Course Persistent and Late-Onset Adolescent offenders: Impulsivity, Peers, and Social Reputations. Springer 2009

 

Church J.  Church Report: The Definition, Diagnosis and Treatment of Children and Youth with Severe Behavioural Difficulties.  Ministry of Education 2003

 

Day A, Howells K, Rickwood D, Current trends in the rehabilitation of Juvenile Offenders,  in Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No 284 (2004)

Greenwood P., Prevention and Intervention Programs for Juvenile Offenders  The Future of Children - Volume 18, Number 2, Fall 2008, pp. 185-210

 

Guerra N. Kim T. Boxer P (eds) What Works – Best practice with Juvenile Offenders The Guilford Press 2008

 

Guerra N. Hodge R. Boxer P (eds) Treating Juvenile Offenders The Guilford Press 2008

 

Howell J C, -Preventing & Reducing Juvenile Delinquency: A Comprehensive Framework  Sage Publications lnc.2003

 

Landenberger, N.A. & Lipsey, M.W. (2005).   The positive effects of cognitive behavioural programmes for offenders: a meta-analysis of factors associated with effective treatment.  In Press Journal of Criminology 2005

 

Latessa E, What Works and What Doesn’t in Reducing Recidivism:  The Principles of Effective Intervention Presentation Centre for Criminal Research, University of Cincinnati 2006

 

Lipsey M, What Works with Juvenile Offenders:  Translating Research into Practice, Adolescent treatment Issues Conference Tampa 2005

 

McLaren, K.L. (2000) Tough is not enough:  Getting Smart with Young Offenders.  Ministry of Youth Affairs

 

Underwood, L.A. & Knight, P. (2006) Treatment and post-release rehabilitative programs for juvenile offenders.  Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America 15, 539-556

 

Ward, T (2002) The management of risk and the design of good lives.  Australian Psychologist, 37, 172-179

 

Zampese, L. When the bough breaks: A literature-based intervention strategy for young offenders.  Christchurch, New Zealand:  Psychological Service, Department of Corrections (1998)

 

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